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academically ablest students, with appropriate allowance for the representation of 
groups. We simply cannot predict much of interest with the other intuitively pleas-
ing criteria now available. 
These conclusions are, in my opinion, sound and well sup-
ported by the available evidence. 
OUT OF ORDER: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE 
CRISIS OF DOCTRINAIRE LIBERALISM. By Nicholas 
Capaldi.1 Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books. 1985. Pp. 
X, 201. $17.95. 
Mary/ee C Tay/or2 
In this book, Nicholas Capaldi endeavors to persuade us that 
liberalism is bad, that it dominates university culture, and that one 
of its pernicious outgrowths is affirmative action. We are told at the 
outset: "[A]ffirmative action was the inevitable consequence of the 
social philosophy known as doctrinaire liberalism, ... doctrinaire 
liberalism is the entrenched philosophy of academic social sci-
ence, ... affirmative action very nearly destroyed the university as 
a viable, independent institution-and it would have if that policy 
had remained unchecked." 
Since affirmative action is such a central target for Capaldi, I 
will begin by considering his description of affirmative action and its 
social context. I will then look at Capaldi's theoretical depiction of 
liberalism. 
I 
Capaldi attempts to attack the foundation of affirmative action, 
which he identifies as "the assumption that the potential of blacks is 
roughly equivalent to that of whites." Elsewhere he explains his 
meaning: in line with their assumption that talent is proportionally 
distributed across races and sexes, affirmative action proponents in-
terpret unequal outcomes to reveal unequal societal treatment in 
need of remedy. Capaldi is right on this. Phrased differently, un-
less one believes that races or sexes differ in potential or natural 
talent, social factors become the only reasonable explanations for 
differences in outcomes. He is also right in noting that we do not 
I. Professor of Philosophy, Queens College, CUNY. 
2. Associate Professor of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University. 
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have direct evidence about the distribution of natural talent, and we 
probably never will. 
Objection must be voiced, however, to Capaldi's claim that in 
the absence of evidence the "burden of proof" lies with those who 
claim proportional distribution of talent across races and sexes. 
Capaldi's refusal to assume that races and sexes are equal in natural 
talent is the linchpin of his argument against affirmative action. 
Few notions seem farther from our nation's modem ideals than the 
proposition that races and sexes should be assumed innately une-
qual unless proven otherwise. 
Other lines of the author's argument against affirmative action 
introduce false claims, factual errors, and unsupported perceptions 
that could only contribute negatively to an understanding of this 
complex policy area. A few examples will be instructive. 
As preface to the discussion of affirmative action, the author 
states that "de jure" segregation never did exist in northern schools 
and had disappeared from southern schools by 1963. As a substan-
tial body of judicial opinions testify, this is false. The distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation of schools has been crucial 
for the courts: only de jure segregation provides the basis for judi-
cial orders mandating busing and other measures designed to in-
crease racial balance. In the famous Keyes decisionJ the Supreme 
Court describes "the essential elements of de jure segregation" as 
"stated simply, a current condition of segregation resulting from 
intentional state action." In Keyes, crucial state actions (of the 
school board) included manipulation of student attendance zones 
and school site selection; at issue was the scope of the remedy that 
could be imposed in response to demonstrated constitutional viola-
tions. In other cities the particulars have been different. But evi-
dence of state-imposed, de jure school segregation has been found in 
the great majority of cases in the North and West.4 Capaldi's char-
acterization of de jure segregation as an obsolete southern phenome-
non runs directly contrary to fact. 
Capaldi proceeds to argue that federal intervention on behalf of 
racial equity in higher education was unnecessary, because: 
In the North, the last vestiges of discrimination in higher education admissions had 
all but disappeared by the early fifties, including quotas in professional graduate 
schools. In fact, as one admissions officer of a leading university told me in confi-
dence, the universities had been quietly employing a double standard preferential 
admissions policy with regard to blacks since the late fifties. Any black applicant 
3. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
4. G. 0RFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED ScHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY 19-
22 (1978). 
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who in the eyes of the admissions committee seemed likely to complete the program 
was accepted, even in preference to non-black students with better credentials. 
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The author provides no documentation for his general claim 
about another "higher education" or "the universities," save this 
chat with one admissions officer. This reviewer might balance that 
anecdote with her own, recalling the admissions director in an up-
state New York college who in 1967 could still brag about his suc-
cess in "keeping the niggers off this campus." Readers could 
undoubtedly add their own varied stories. With respect to minority 
admissions or just about anything else, there is no uniform practice 
across colleges and universities. In fact, graduate school admissions 
for various disciplines and professional programs are typically so 
decentralized within institutions that describing the range of prac-
tices employed in a single university necessitates a major institu-
tional research effort. 
We can be sure, however, that preferential admissions of blacks 
has not been common, much less ubiquitous, since "the late fifties." 
Nor had other aspects of race and sex inequity been eradicated 
before the advent of affirmative action. A few particularly relevant 
facts from other sources can be mentioned: 
(I) Black and white college enrollment rates began to converge not during 
the 1950's and 1960's, but during the 1970's. And even in 1981, only 19% of young 
black men were going to college, compared to 28% of white men in their cohort. 5 
The underrepresentation of blacks in graduate school has always been even more 
dramatic than at the undergraduate level. 
(2) Pennsylvania, along with nine southern and border states, was named in 
the 1970 Adams v. Richardson case, in which plaintiffs asked the court to order 
HEW enforcement of desegregation in state colleges and universities. Resultant 
programs for desegregation were developed slowly, state by state. It was 1983 
before Pennsylvania submitted an acceptable plan for desegregation of the state sys-
tem of higher education.6 
(3) From their 1975 survey, E.C. Ladd, Jr., and S.M. Lipset noted that blacks 
"make up II percent of the general public, but only 3 percent of academics," a 
proportion that "has remained basically the same over the last decade." Further, 
"Blacks are no more heavily represented in the young faculty groups than in the 
older, and they remain clustered at the less prestigious schools." The reasons? In 
the words of Ladd and Lipset, "Jews, Catholics, and blacks have encountered 'di· 
reel' discrimination in admissions and faculty hiring, apart from 'indirect' discrimi-
nation found in limits on general social and economic opportunity. Some of this has 
been eradicated while other elements of it remain:•7 
(4) Using data gathered by the American Council on Education, H.S. Astin 
5. R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP? 21 (1984). 
6. Farrell, Pennsylvania Submits Its Desegregation Plan; Is Last State to Meet Dead-
lines Set by Court, 26 CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., July 27, 1983, at 8; Status of Desegregation 
Cases in 19 States, 26 CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., June 2, 1983, at 17. 
7. Ladd & Lipset, Professors' Religious and Ethnic Backgrounds, II CHRON. HIGHER 
Eouc., Sept. 22, 1975, at 2. 
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and M.B. Snyder found that "women constituted only 16.7% of all new college 
hires between 1967 and 1972." The difference between actual salary and the salary 
that would be predicted on the basis of qualifications in the 1972 sample was, on the 
average, $1622 for married women and $1895 for single women.s 
As if it were not enough to offer a thoroughly inaccurate por-
trayal of the context in which affirmative action arose, Capaldi goes 
on to misrepresent the character of affirmative action itself. Read-
ers are led to believe that, as a matter of definition, implementation 
of affirmative action in higher education means relaxation of stan-
dard criteria for admissions and hiring. Regarding student body 
composition, the author implies that all affirmative action programs 
entail the kind of two-pronged admissions procedure at issue in the 
Bakke case, saying: "One of the consequences of implementing af-
firmative action is to funnel all blacks into a separate admissions 
procedure." Later discussion refers to "discount" admittees. And, 
ignoring evidence he himself had presented in an earlier chapter 
showing that only a minority of faculty favor preferential hiring, 
Capaldi provides this description of affirmative action in faculty 
appointments: 
Armed with what looked like a mere platitude, committed liberals engage in prefer-
ential hiring of women and minorities. Black and female Ph.D.'s with even minor 
achievements are to be preferred over other Ph.D's with major achievements. Black 
and female graduate students are to be preferred over current holders of the Ph.D. 
degree. There is a mountain of incriminating reports and documents to substantiate 
many claims of this kind. 
The book, however, doesn't give any clue as to where that "moun-
tain" of evidence might be found. Instead, the only substantiation 
Capaldi provides is an account of a discussion he had with some 
members of his own department. 
These discussions of student admissions and faculty hiring are 
gravely misleading. As noted earlier, the diversity of institutional 
practices defies attempts at facile generalization.9 But if a single 
pattern were to be picked as typical of affirmative action implemen-
tation in higher education, it would be fairer to say that affirmative 
action has most often entailed expanded recruitment publicity for 
student and faculty slots, perhaps some formalization of selection 
procedures, and more systematic recordkeeping for the entire pro-
cess. to With respect to faculty selection, the Carnegie Council on 
8. Astin & Snyder, Affirmative Action 1972-1982: A Decade of Response, 14 CHANGE: 
MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING, July 1982, at 26-31, 59. 
9. For an attempt at description of affirmative action implementation within one uni-
versity, see Steele & Green, Affirmative Action and Academic Hiring: A Case Study of a 
Values Conflict, 47 J. HIGHER Eouc., 413-35 (1976). 
10. Here I use the term affirmative action in the broad sense intended by Capaldi. Be-
cause the formal affirmative action plan generally required of universities covers employees 
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Policy Studies in Higher Education found in 1975 that only a small 
minority of university affirmative action plans provided even that 
women or minorities be given preference over candidates who were 
otherwise equally qualified.tt And the AAUP recommendations 
for affirmative action explicitly note that "standards should be the 
same for all candidates" and that "appointments should be made on 
the basis of individual merit."t2 The moderate tone and modest 
content of recommendations for affirmative action implementation 
provided by these two groups, both of which presumably fall 
squarely in Capaldi's liberal camp, give some clue to the deviation 
of Capaldi's portrayal from reality. 
Other factual errors in Capaldi's discussion of affirmative ac-
tion might be mentioned. In the discussion of black economic sta-
tus, we read: "[T]here is little or no evidence to support the 
contention that a lack of jobs or discrimination in available jobs is 
the serious problem." And regarding undergraduate education, Ca-
paldi tells us: "If the body is warm, some college will actively pur-
sue you. There is hardly any excuse available in our society for 
anyone who does not go to college." 
Besides its inaccuracy, the book is badly dated. The essays re-
act to a perceived onslaught of affirmative action, but they reach us 
five years into the Reagan administration. Minorities are now a de-
clining portion of undergraduate and graduate student bodies. Ap-
parently, Capaldi's essays were written long before their May 1985 
publication date. The repeated present tense references to HEW, an 
agency name that vanished under reorganization in 1979, are 
revealing. 
II 
While Capaldi's account of affirmative action is merely mud-
dled, his portrayal of liberalism and its role in academia seems al-
most delusional. Quoting a few of his key passages will convey the 
flavor of Capaldi's ideas. 
Capaldi portrays liberal social scientistsu as self-styled social 
but not students, many institutions reserve the term affirmative action for employee issues 
and refer to student recruitment and selection in some other terms, e.g., as an equal opportu-
nity program. 
II. CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, MAKING AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTIOI' WORK IN HIGHER EDUCATION 81 (1975). 
12. Affirmative Action Plans, 68 ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 19A. 
13. First, liberalism is described as consisting of: 
[A] basic psychological theory and derivative theories of social structure, politics, 
and history. The theory of liberalism in general and its basic psychological compo-
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engineers, finding a rationale for their behavior in "doctrinaire lib-
eralism," which we learn about in the following passage: 
The heart of doctrinaire liberalism is the belief that man is the victim of circum-
stances greater than himself-social, political, and psychological. The masses can-
not comprehend these great impersonal forces that guide their destiny. 
Understanding is necessarily limited to a vanguard of enlightened men and women 
who can free mankind by obtaining control of the state machinery and using their 
new-found power for the purpose of breaking the chains that have always fettered 
mankind. 
The role of liberalism in higher education is sketched as 
follows: 
The first move of liberalism within higher education is to crush internal 
opposition. . . . 
The second move of liberalism within higher education is to establish that there 
are no legitimate external frames of reference in terms of which it can be judged 
.... In practice this means that if the community at large or relevant funders of the 
university democratically decide that what the university is doing is wrong, the new 
class will not allow the outside democratic structure to circumvent its plans. It 
clearly does not have a fundamental commitment to democracy. Nor does it have a 
fundamental commitment to university autonomy. These slogans are hypocritically 
invoked as means to ends. 
How does it justify this hypocrisy? It does this by refusing to recognize that 
there is such a thing as a moral choice or an ethical conflict or even a legitimate 
political difference. All value judgments or decisions will be based on the purely 
objective assessment of the most efficient means to achieve the ends built into 
human nature. Social scientists and fellow travelers in the humanities who teach 
relevant literature and art will become the experts .... 
The third movement of liberalism within higher education is the reform of 
external society .... Liberals confuse their own rallies and teach-ins with critical 
reappraisal. The only thing they never reappraise is doctrinaire liberalism itself. 
Under the guise of criticism, the rally turns into a form of mass persuasion and 
subliminial propaganda for liberalism .... 
The mass rally is an ideal tool because it is an extension of the large lecture. 
The large lecture, as you will recall, is the natural home of rhetoricians of liberal-
culture. Unlike the small seminar and the laboratory, it conditions students to be-
come passive recipients of someone else's thought. 
nent can be defined as teleological. A theory is teleological if it seeks to explain any 
act, event, or process as the outcome of goal-directed behavior . 
. . . [W]hat is peculiar to liberalism is the belief that every human being has a 
built-in nature to achieve certain ends, that these ends are not matters of choice or 
of external factors. 
Thus, the character of psychology and sociology are defined: 
In liberal psychology, the ends are desires provided from within. The means 
are provided by the environment. There is no element of real choice. . . . 
This leads us into the liberal conception of sociology. For the liberal, society is 
the individual writ large. That is, the structure of society is a macrocosm of the 
structure of the individual. Just as each individual is the product of his interacting 
drives, so society is the product of the interacting individuals who make it up. This 
mirror imaging of individual and society we can call psychologism. 
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In the concluding chapters, fascism becomes the key word. We 
read that "the New Deal was moving in the direction of fascism" 
and that "[f]ascism is not a reactionary or rightist movement but 
the fruit of liberalism itself." Then, since "it is safe to identify the 
norms of the argument for affirmative action as those of liberalism," 
the reader is not surprised when Capaldi finds "that affirmative ac-
tion is a form of fascism." More specifically: 
The parallels [of Mussolini's fascism] with affirmative action are obvious. Affirma-
tive action is temporary. It is a bold and innovative program, an experiment that 
transcends traditional logic. Its goal is the organic recreation of America, and it is 
pragmatic certainly in the pejorative sense of bending principles to fit some objec-
tive. Like the followers of Mussolini, liberals are fascinated by the rhetoric and 
theory, and complacently ignore the practice .... 
There are some puzzling inconsistencies in Capaldi's perspec-
tive. On the one hand, we have the portrayal of liberalism's 
"psychologistic view of the relationship between individuals and so-
ciety," and its failure to "recognize anything as a motive force ex-
cept individual desires," so that in the liberal view "all racism is the 
product of prejudice." On the other hand, Capaldi accurately de-
scribes the concept of institutional discrimination as distinguished 
from intentional discrimination and later disparages affirmative ac-
tion advocates' "claim that 'discrimination' is not a mere matter of 
consciously held policies but of cumulative and indirect social 
forces." Does Capaldi believe that liberals see society as "the indi-
vidual writ large," or not? 
Equally difficult to reconcile are the author's various portrayals 
of liberalism. Often liberalism is a monolithic (indeed totalitarian) 
force responsible for affirmative action. But elsewhere the author 
outlines three versions of liberalism, one of which (the "mer-
itocratic") believes that "policies like affirmative action will be det-
rimental in the long run even to minorities." At one point, the 
author says, "The incoherence of liberalism lies precisely in its be-
ing an empty set of formulas from which one can infer contradic-
tory policies and any number of alternative versions." Indeed, the 
reader begins to suspect that for Capaldi, "liberalism" is simply a 
name for all the forces of evil. 
The author sums up by saying: 
I am convinced that the policy of affirmative action is the product of a kind of 
historical hallucination . . . I have tried in this book to provide a form of therapy 
for this misperception. If the historical review fails to accomplish a truer percep-
tion, it is because egalitarians, as we shall see, are driven by political fanaticism, not 
by any objective grievance that could be understood or dealt with within the histori-
cal framework of the social life we all share. 
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One wonders whether it is not the author, rather than his egali-
tarian targets, who suffers from "historical hallucinations." 
COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN 
THE LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES. By J. 
Anthony Lukas.' New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1985. Pp. 
659. $19.95. 
Miriam K Feldman 2 
This book documents one of the great failures in American life. 
It is a story of betrayal and the end of a part of the American 
Dream. It is a story of the conflict between constitutional law and 
social realities. It is the story of the desegregation of the Boston 
public schools, as told through the lives of three families. One reads 
it and weeps. 
One weeps for Boston, which has never been the same since 
federal district court Judge Arthur Garrity issued his sweeping 
cross-city busing order in 1974. But one weeps for the rest of 
America too, because Common Ground is a parable. In it, one reads 
the story of every American city faced with the intractable problem 
of trying to uphold a constitutional mandate, while groping for the 
appropriate means to do so. 
I 
Judge Garrity's decision was backed by sufficient precedent. 
In 1968, Green v. County School Board 3 required a "root and 
branch"4 elimination of racial discrimination in schools. Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educations took that mandate one 
step further. It ruled that district courts could order a variety of 
measures, including those which were "administratively awkward, 
inconvenient, and even bizarre."6 To be sure, these precedents con-
cerned Southern-style, de jure segregation, imposed by people who 
would just as soon have bused white children for miles to avoid 
going back to school with the black children who lived down the 
I. Journalist, author, and contributor to periodicals. 
2. Journalist and parent of children in Minneapolis public schools. Portions of this 
essay originally appeared in the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. 
3. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
4. /d. at 438. 
5. 402 u.s. 1 (1973). 
6. /d. at 28. 
